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Abstract
In cultural studies discourse theory is of-
ten used. Remarkably, the politically
oriented work of Laclau & Mouffe has
hardly been used whilst it is extremely
useful for researching culture: Laclau &
Mouffe can indeed be helpful to research
media, conﬂict, and identity (politics).
Their discourse theory (and that of oth-
ers) can be seen as a ‘toolbox’ that can be
combined with qualitative research meth-
ods. I agree with the concept of the
‘toolbox’ but argue that the complexity of
combining Laclau & Mouffe with other
researchmethodsandtheorieswithincul-
tural studies requires the formulation of
the conditions under which this is possi-
ble. I shall discuss these conditions and
expand on the relationship between La-
clau and Mouffe and cultural studies re-
search. I do so by analysing the represen-
tation of Ayatollah Khomeini in Western
television news from 1978 through 1989.
In Western eyes Khomeini is a powerful
even threatening individual: in his ratio-
nal treatment he appears to have control
of irrationality (in the form of ‘irrational’
masses). And irrationality is something
that in Western culture is experienced as
very threatening. Khomeini has, in West-
ern perspective, the power over threat-
ening irrationality. And that makes him
all the more terrifying: he is represented
as an ’antagonist’ of great proportion be-
cause he is able to both unleash and mas-
ter the irrational.
Keywords: Ayatollah Khomeini, Chantalle Mouffe, cultural studies, discourse
theory, Ernesto Laclau, media studies
D
ISCOURSE, both as theory and method, is a useful concept in cultural
studies, whereby Foucault’s work is widely used. However the dis-
course theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, though less commonly
used 1, is particularly relevant for studying cultural phenomena from the per-
spective of cultural studies. In this article I aim to show how and under which
1. On page 16-18 Carpentier & Spinoy (2008) list the exceptions (which are not always
explicitly based on Laclau & Mouffe).
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conditions cultural studies can beneﬁt form the discourse theory of Laclau &
Mouffe.
In political studies Laclau & Mouffe are recognized key thinkers; cultural
studies, onthecontrary, hasonlyrecentlyseentheﬁrststructuralattempt(Car-
pentier & Spinoy, 2008) to integrate their discourse theory in cultural analy-
sis. Carpentier & Spinoy demonstrate the usefulness of Laclau & Mouffe for
researching conﬂict and identity (politics)(2008:17). Carpentier & Spinoy’s
have ﬁve arguments for integrating Laclau & Mouffe into cultural studies; I
will discuss three. Firstly, Laclau & Mouffe employ a broad deﬁnition of ‘the
political’, making it possible to include cultural aspects in a politicized way
(2008:2). Secondly, in line with Foucault’s view Laclau & Mouffe consider
discourse theory to be a ‘toolbox’ for several academic disciplines. Carpentier
&SpinoyarereferingtoHowarthwhostatesthatdiscoursetheorycanbecom-
plemented with qualitative research methods in order to ﬁnd emperical foun-
dations in research (Howarth, 2000:140 in: Carpentier & Spinoy, 2008:21).
This ‘toolbox’ idea of discourse theory is plausible but, in my opinion, re-
quires a formulation of the conditions under which Laclau & Mouffe could
be combined with other theories and methods. In section 4 I will demonstrate
the guiding (philosophical) premises; it is ﬁrst necessary to elaborate on their
theoretical positions.
Thirdly, Laclau & Mouffe focus their discourse theory on the study of
politics, culture and identity concepts that are also central to cultural studies
(2008:3). 2 The discrepancy between the usefulness of Laclau & Mouffe for
cultural research and the lack of attention given to their work within cultural
studies is therefore remarkable.
To better understand the usefulness of Laclau & Mouffe I will discuss
more extensively three main aspects: their discourse theory in general, the
‘toolbox’ idea of combining discourse analysis with other theories and meth-
ods, and the relationship between their thinking and cultural studies.
I shall place Laclau & Mouffe within cultural studies by analysing a spe-
ciﬁc case: the representation of Ayatollah Khomeini in Western television
news. Interestingly this representation is characterised by conﬂict and a rever-
sal in the valuation of the protagonist - two aspects Laclau & Mouffe’s dis-
2. The other two arguments concern Laclau & Mouffe’s engagement with (high) culture,
and the incorporation by cultural studies of other poststructuralist and discourse analytical
approaches (Carpentier & Spinoy 2008: 2).i
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course theory focusses on. At the start of the Iranian revolution (1978-1979)
Khomeini is partly appreciated in the West for his intellectual greatness. Soon
after this representation alters: Khomeini is considered to be extremely bad,
to the point of being evil. This case and Laclau & Mouffe’s discourse theory
offer the opportunity to demonstrate how changes in discourses occur: Laclau
& Mouffe are more appropriate than for instance Foucault to explain how and
why dicourses are subject to change. How did the discourse on Ayatollah
Khomeini change?
Case: Khomeini in the news
In the winter of 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran after being in ex-
ile for 15 years; the Shah is dispelled. There is great joy among the adherents
of different groups: from the neo-Marxists to monarchists and religious fol-
lowers. The return of Khomeini has been made possible by years of protests
against the Shah, forcing the latter to ﬂee abroad.
The enthusiasm from the early days of the Iranian Revolution also reaches
the West: with a mixture of admiration and disapproval the events are re-
ported. Ayatollah Khomeini becomes the personiﬁcation of the Revolution,
partly because he is able to receive journalists from Western media in his
French home in exile. The West does not know how to judge him. As a his-
tory program on Dutch television puts it in retrospective, he is on the one hand
seen as just:
‘At the end of 1978 Western intellectuals hold the image [of Khomeini] of
a holy man who advocates a much more righteous, democratic and spiritual
regime than the cruel and corrupt Shah.’ 3
Simultaneously, the overthrow of the Western-minded Shah government is
disapproved by some politicians, citizens and media. Shortly after the media
construction of Khomeini changes into a - in Western eyes - malicious person.
This leads to the research question: How was Ayatollah Khomeini represented
in Western television news from 1978 to 1989? (1978 was the ﬁrst time he
appeared on Western television news, 1989 was the year he died.) I aim to
demonstrate how a Western media discourse is able to change.
3. ANDERE TIJDEN, VPRO 30 September 2003.i
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The case material consists of news feeds used by Dutch television news. 4
This case material is partly similar to that of other Western nations: only
news feeds from international news agencies have been archived. It consists
of video and audio clips of press exchange services, with no news reader or
voice-over of a reporter (with a few exceptions). Unfortunately, the archive
therefore does not allow the contextualisation of these clips by a news anchor
and / or reporter to be analyzed. However, the material provides insight into
international (at least: Western!) modes of representation; it consists of edit-
ing sequences of news agencies like ARD, ZDF (both from Germany), BBC,
ITN (both United Kingdom), and CBS (USA).
It is striking that Khomeini has barely received any media attention in the
Netherlands in the period upto 1978: he appears just four times on Dutch
television. This is then compensated at the start of the Revolution. From 1979
onwards there is an overwhelming coverage on him in the media: he appears
ﬁfteen times in 1979 and over ﬁfty times from 1979 through 1989. He gains
attention everywhere in the West. The reason for his apparent absence from
DutchandotherWesternmediaispossiblypartlytheresultofalackofinterest
in ‘Islamic affairs’: the Iranian Revolution is one of the ﬁrst events to receive
large scale media coverage.
What do the archived news images tell us about Ayatollah Khomeini? The
ﬁrst images ever to be seen in The Netherlands are from the early days of the
Revolution. In 1978 he speaks from his French home in exile. In the ﬁrst news
item 5 he represents himself in a way that will prove to be dominant during the
ﬁrst year. He sits on the ﬂoor of an austere room; the only striking aspect is
the wallpaper with ﬂowery motifs. He is austerely dressed in a completely
black outﬁt. His medium long beard is gray and has some white and black
shades, his eyes remain directed to the ﬂoor.
The tranquility that he seems to possess as he focusess little attention to
himself is also present in his message. With quiet voice he states (in transla-
4. The case material is archived at Sound & Vision (Hilversum, The Netherlands). The
database of Sound & Vision lists all the television material in which Khomeini appears as
‘Persons: Khomeiny, Ruhollah’. Where sources like Wikipedia write his name as Khomeini,
Sound & Vision uses a different spelling: Khomeiny with a ‘y’. Just to be clear: this research
is only based on television clips dealing with Khomeini, not on, for example, the occupation of
the American Embassy or the Iran-Iraq war (unless Khomeini himself is present in these clips).
5. HET JOURNAAL 6 November 1978.i
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tion): ’People do not want the Shah and his regime. Nor will replacing one
government with another satisfy the people. They have to leave people alone
to form their own government’. 6 He attributes the activity and legitimacy of
theeventsinIrannottohimself, buttotheIranianpeople. Bothhisappearance
and his words connote modesty.
In a subsequent broadcast the (American) journalist Robert MacNeil ex-
tensively interviews Khomeini at his French home. 7 Both are seated on ﬂoor
rugs. Khomeini downplays his role when asked if he would command his
followers to use force against the army of the Shah. He presents himself not
as the man with authority who gives orders, but asserts that his people do not
wish to ﬁght the army but will do so if necessary to claim their rights. Any
use of violence is presented as a legitimate response to an oppressive state and
above all as an undesirable situation that his followers are forced into by their
opponents. The closing images of the interview depict Khomeini amongst
praying men and women. This reinforces the images of the elementary home
interior and the ﬂoor seating: he appears to be a leader uninterested in per-
sonal, worldly power or material wealth.
From then on television broadcasts regularly shows Khomeini receiving
guests both journalists and supporters. 8 Whether it is with other religious
leaders or with interviewers, he is generally portrayed in the same setting:
a room with carpets and wallpaper with ﬂowery motif which almost looks
familiar. His pose hardly changes: his eyes are directed to the ﬂoor, he has a
simple clothing style and a soft voice. There are two other settings in which he
is portrayed: the entrance of his French home 9 and the nearby prayer tent 10.
The small-sized house is like its neighboring buildings situated in a narrow
street in a rural environment. ‘The world’ in the form of foreign journalists
visits Khomeini. But his house is too small to receive ‘the world’: due to
a lack of space journalists are received in the garden and on the street. The
prayer tent, which is quite spacious, is within walking distance of his house.
6. The translation of the Farsi-quote is provided by the English subtitles. HET JOURNAAL
6 November 1978.
7. HET JOURNAAL 2 December 1978.
8. E.g. HET JOURNAAL 19 December 1978 and HET JOURNAAL 13 January 1979.
9. E.g. HET JOURNAAL 8 January 1979 and HET JOURNAAL 16 January 1979.
10. E.g. HET JOURNAAL 18 January 1979 and HET JOURNAAL 25 January 1979.i
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Khomeini never appears alone near the tent: there is always a large group of
journalists, religious leaders and ordinary believers present.
Despite the change of setting his appearance remains the same as inside
hishome: Khomeiniappearsmodestnotaspiringtoworldlypowerorpersonal
status. This portrayal remains unchanged for a short while upon his returns to
Iran on 1 February 1979. Though a new element is introduced: chaos. As he
walks down the aircraft stairs in his familiar black outﬁt crowds of journalists
andmilitarymenareseenpushingandpullingtogetaglimpseofKhomeini. 11
And as his car drives off soldiers run behind it for no apparent reason. This
scene is followed by Khomeini’s tour through the streets of Tehran: tens of
thousands of mostly male supporters crowd the streets. Security men on the
car ward off frenzied fans and viewers only get to see a glimpse of Khomeini.
What makes these chaotic scenes positive is the joy his return has caused:
balloons are released into the sky and crowds are witnessed singing.
Nevertheless, these images contain the elements of the negative interpra-
tion of Khomeini in the West: the chaotic scenes include armed men and fren-
zied supporters. On 14th February 1979 images of a shooting are broadcast.
Masked men are seen running down the streets; they are shooting without ap-
parent coordination or direction. A car speeds off as a riﬂe is thrown out of the
window. Another car follows a military jeep that enters a gate. There is uncer-
tainty over the power structures between these people (who is in charge?), the
purpose of the actions and above all over the presence or absence of discipline
to channel the events (whether it concerns a massive turn-out on the streets or
an armed conﬂict) in order to prevent a loss of control. Because that is exactly
what is expected in (Western) public spaces.
Khomeini partly takes up the role of directing the events: he calmly calls
for weaponry to be turned in with severe penalties as countermeasure. The
ﬁrst part of his call is consistent with earlier news reports: the soft spoken
Khomeini denouncing violence; the second part is new: Khomeini promoting
coercive measures. In retrospect it can be concluded that the period shortly af-
ter his return to Iran is a transitional phase in which the representation changes
fromKhomeiniasmodestmanlackingworldlypowerclaimstoKhomeiniasa
negatively valued power politician. Gradually the last representation prevails
in the West.
11. HET JOURNAAL 1 February 1979.i
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The gradual representation changes of Khomeini start in 1979. Interest-
ingly he is hardly ever present in television news during the occupation of the
American embassy in Tehran (1979-1981). He is however seen at the end of
a news coverage on an armed clash between different religious followers in
the city of Qom. 12 In the aftermath of a battle (with images of faces cov-
ered with blood and bandages, pools of blood on the ground, a car driving
through a hysterical crowd etc.) Khomeini is shown looking stoically when
visiting Ayatollah Madari with whom he is having a dispute. At the end of
his visit Khomeini declares that the violence will ‘God willingly’ stop. The
English voice-over ends the report with: ‘Khomeini, the all powerful leader of
Iran’. 13 This marks the turning point in the representation of Khomeini: from
now on he is shown as someone who has political (instead of only religious or
moral) power and is able and willing to use that power in the midst of chaotic
scenes. During the entire decade (the 1980’s) his representation in the West
is extremely one-dimensional: he is the calm person amidst emotional scenes.
Even more so: he seems to have control over those emotions.
Chronologically, there are thus three distinct phases: during his ‘French
era’, the early days of the Revolution, he is represented as modest. Then
there is a transitional phase: shortly after his arrival in Iran he is seen as
the embodiment of calmness amidst chaos. During the longest period, the
entire 1980’s, he is represented in Western news reports as a person who, as
a political and religious leader, has (absolute) power over emotional crowds.
This change in discourse can be understood on a theretical level with Laclau
& Mouffe’s work on discourses. Before I will go into that I shall position
Laclau & Mouffe within the broader ﬁeld of discourse theory to indicate the
speciﬁc nature of their thinking.
The ﬁeld of discourse theory
Despite the differences between the many forms of discourse theory, of
which Foucault is probably the best known within cultural studies, there are
four aspects that they have in common (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 5-6).
Firstly, they examine the world and knowledge about it not "objectively" but
critically (or: as normatively constructed). From there it follows, and that
is the second aspect, that knowledge is considered historically and cultur-
12. HET JOURNAAL 6 December 1979 and HET JOURNAAL 9 December 1979.
13. HET JOURNAAL 9 December 1979.i
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ally speciﬁc, and, thirdly, as shaped by social interaction. Fourthly, the re-
lationship between knowledge and social action implies that different types of
knowledge lead to different types of social action. This commonality between
discourse theories is rooted largely in their Foucauldian origin. The result
is that discourse analysts explicitly relate themselves to Foucault, who views
discourses as (largely) bound by rules. Laclau & Mouffe, but others as well,
differ from Foucault as they insist on a more conﬂicting concept of discourses.
Foucault was the ﬁrst to understand ‘the subject’ in a discourse analyti-
cal way. He built on Althusser’s concept of interpellation and ideology. It
is crucial that the construction of a social position for a subject by means of
language is inevitable according to Althusser: the subject can only be an ide-
ological subject. This determinism is heavily criticized (Jørgensen & Phillips,
2002: 16-18). Laclau & Mouffe depart in two ways from this determinism.
First, they recognize that there is not one totalizing ideology that is subjecting
people: subject positions change when the context changes. But to Laclau
& Mouffe the debate over the determination of subjects is of secondary im-
portance: they are more interested in abstract discursive processes than in
singular, concrete cases – something they share with Foucault. Secondly, they
state that the concept of ideology itself is problematic; ’ideology’ implies that
the truth can be known when all distortions (or: misrepresentations) are re-
moved. In contrast to discourse theorists like Fairclough (1995) Laclau &
Mouffe view ‘ideology’ as an empty concept - they therefore do not use it in
a neo-Marxist way.
This brings us to a crucial point of Laclau & Mouffe. They consider it
impossible to distinguish between ideological and non-ideological discourses
in the hope to step outside of ideology. Unlike for instance Althusser, Fou-
cault and Critical Discourse Analysist (like Fairclough and others) Laclau
& Mouffe hold the opinion that there are non-discursive aspects to social
practices: bodies, institutions, economy, infrastructure etc. are all part of
discourses. Thus there is no dialectical relationship between discourses and
something else: ’discourse itself is fully constitutive of our world’ (Jørgensen
& Phillips, 2002: 20). With this Laclau & Mouffe represent the most post-
structuralist form of discourse analysis: discourses are always in relation to
other discourses, which brings forth a constant struggle between discourses
to gain hegemony (as a –unattainable- ﬁxation of meanings). This ’discursive
struggle’ leads Laclau & Mouffe to focus on changes in discourses. Theiri
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theory is therefore extremely useful to understand the changing representa-
tions of Ayatollah Khomeini. But in order to analyse these changes it is ﬁrst
necessary to discuss Laclau & Mouffe further now that their position in the
discursive ﬁeld has been noted.
Laclau & Mouffe
Laclau & Mouffe are not so much interested in speciﬁc practices, but in
abstract discourses, although always accompanied by the idea that discourses
are created, changed and maintained in everyday practice. They therefore fo-
cus on how discourses limit our possibilities, instead of looking at human ac-
tivity. This is a consequence of the critical project of Laclau & Mouffe (1985)
to unmask naturalized knowledge. They do so by demonstrating contingen-
cies (the deconstruction of ﬁxations of meaning); this opens opportunities for
alternative ways of thinking and acting. However, the alternatives are also not
non-ideological or non-discursive: Laclau (1990) argues that it is true that ide-
ology implies a distortion, but that this is inevitable since any representation
of the world is a distortion. Thereby Laclau & Mouffe correspond to ideology
criticism in that, ﬁrstly, they expose contingencies and, secondly, deconstruct
’objectivity’; they also deviate from it by stating that there is no ideology-
free truth as an alternative. They align themselves with post-structuralism by
pointing out the non-absolute nature of discursive structures, so that the de-
termination of social subjects can never be total. This non-absolute, in other
words contingent, nature of discourses enables dislocations: a dislocation is
a ‘destabilization of a discourse that results from the emergence of events
which cannot be domesticated, symbolized or integrated within the discourse
in question’(Torﬁng , 1999: 301). It is a process whereby discursive structures
become visible, allowing Torﬁng to conclude that ‘dislocation is the very form
of temporality, possibility and freedom’(Torﬁng, 1999: 148-149).
Because of the absence of a determining principle, everything can be seen
as discourse (or as Derrida says, ‘everything becomes discourse’. Derrida,
1978: 280). Laclau & Mouffe therefore use the term discourse to indicate
that any social conﬁguration is meaningful (Laclau & Mouffe, 1990: 100).
The meaning of each material object (from a stone to the human body) isi
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
34 Rob Leurs
articulated within discourses, so that there is nothing in nature that determines
the ‘being’ of an object:
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has noth-
ing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with that
realism / idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an
event that certainly exist in the sense that it occurs here and now, indepen-
dently of my will. But whether their speciﬁcity as objects is constructed
in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, de-
pends upon the structuring of a discursive ﬁeld. What is denied is not that
such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion
that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive con-
ditions of emergence. (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 108)
Thus, discourses are omnipresent in the social ﬁeld: they form a relational
system of meaningful practices. Meanings are differential in nature; they are
established in relation to other meanings, without a ﬁxed reference point in
the ’real’. There is no ultimate ﬁxation of meanings, which also applies to so-
cial identities: these are also differential in nature and therefore only partially
ﬁxed.
This raises the question how we should see this partial ﬁxation. Since both
absolute ﬁxation and absolute non-ﬁxation (because with the latter there are
no discourses, only psychosis) are impossible according to Laclau & Mouffe
(1985: 113) they introduce the concept of ’nodal points’:
[...] order – or structure – no longer takes the form of an underlying
essence of the social; rather, it is an attempt – by deﬁnition unstable and
precarious, to act over that ‘social’, to hegemonize it. [...] the social al-
ways exceeds the limits of the attempts to constitute a society. At the same
time however that ‘totality’ does not disappear: if the suture it attempts is
ultimately impossible, it is nevertheless possible to proceed to a relative
ﬁxation of the social through the institution of nodal points. (Laclau, 1990:
90-91)
Nodal points are reference points that grant a discourse temporary sta-
bility and consistency. In Western discourses the concept of, for instance,
‘democracy’ functions as a nodal point for other meanings such as ’freedom’,
’individuality’ and ’rationality’: the latter elements are articulated in the West-
ern nodal point of ’democracy’. A nodal point, therefore, ensures that partial
ﬁxation can occur in a structured network of meanings. Or in the words of
Laclau & Mouffe:i
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The practice of articulation therefore, consists in the construction of nodal
points which partially ﬁx meaning; and the partial character of this ﬁxation
proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn of the constant
overﬂowing of every discourse by the inﬁnitude of the ﬁeld of discursivity.
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 113).
We can therefore (again) conclude that the discourse theory of Laclau &
Mouffe is characterised by their focus on the possibility of changes in mean-
ings. Indeed, articulation is ‘a practice that establishes a relation among ele-
ments such that their idenity is modiﬁed as a result of the articulatory practice’
(Torﬁng, 1999: 298). By, for example, pairing ‘freedom’ to ‘rationality’ both
concepts are subject to change. Laclau & Mouffe’s focus on changes in dis-
courses implies that they are also applicable to conﬂicts.
As discussed earlier meaning partly arises as a result of difference, or: its
relation to other meanings. And those other meanings are partly ’the other’.
Such a social antagonism is therefore on the one hand constitutive for the for-
mation of identity: it is a point at which something can be negatively referred.
A discourse ﬁnds its limits by the exclusion of ’radical otherness’: that which
has nothing in common with the differential system through which the exclu-
sion takes place. Such a ’constitutive outside’ both limits and denies the lines
of demarcation that are involved in the formation of identity.
A social antagonism is thus also threatening: it ensures that identity can
never be fully completed. If a subjects identiﬁes with meanings there is al-
ways something in their identity that cannot be constructed by these meanings
as an antagonism is always needed as a point of reference. Therefore there
is no subject position with which a person is fully able to identify. A social
antagagonism, or: constitutive outside, is thus both a condition for and a bar-
rier to discursive identity formation. The process takes place according to the
‘logic of equivalence’: the equalization of discourses (A+B+C) in opposition
to the negative discourse of ’the other’ (D): A=B=C 6= D. The result is that the
differences within the chain of equivalence (the differences between A, B and
C) are weakened in contrast to D. For example, countries that comply with
the ’Universal declaration of human rights’ are equalized with each other by
distancing themselves from ‘barbaric cultures’, which is at the same time a
reduction of complexities within the equalized countries. Following the same
logic the complexity increases when the constitutive outside disappears (e.g.
because the joint enemy is defeated); this is the ‘logic of difference’.i
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Now that the basics of Laclau & Mouffe’s discourse have been brieﬂy
(and inevitably also incompletely) presented, I would like to return to what
I stated in section 1. There I mentioned that discourse theory is sometimes
seen as a ‘toolbox’: as something that can be combined and enriched with
other theories and methods.As Laclau & Mouffe (and others, like Foucault)
are ‘short on speciﬁc methodological guidelines and illustrative examples’
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 8) this may increase both its analytical abilities
and its insight in a speciﬁc cultural or social phenomenon. The aims of a
‘toolbox’ is twofold: to deploy the speciﬁc knowledge of each theory, and to
derive an explanatory power from the combination of discourse analysis and
other theories (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 154).
Althoughthis‘toolbox’canbeextremelypowerfulcertainconditionshave
to be observed when using Laclau & Mouffe. The ﬁrst of the three conditions
is that other theories have to be ‘translated’ into discourse analytical terms.
Laclau & Mouffe take the non-essentialist philosophical assumption that ev-
erything in the social and cultural ﬁeld is discursive: theories that recognise
non-discursive aspects (e.g. ‘economy’, ‘human bodies’) have to be brought
in line with non-essentialist thinking. Secondly and based on the previous
point, the selection of the phenomenon to be analysed is based on the theoret-
ical and methodological framework and not vice versa. There are two reasons
for this: Laclau & Mouffe hold the view that knowledge is a product of (re-
search) perspectives and therefore constructs a phenomenon (i.e. the object
of a research), and the selection of a perspective is a political matter as it
can help bring about social change (following the assumption that ‘the social
world’ is a construct that may be understood and re-constructed in different
terms)(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 154-155). Thirdly, eclecticism is to be
avoided when using a ‘toolbox’: one needs to assess the (philosophical, the-
oretical and methodological) relations between the applied approaches when
combining them (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 154-155). Considering the spe-
ciﬁc nature of Laclau & Mouffe’s discourse theory these three conditions are
crucial to undertaking valid ‘toolbox’ research in the social and cultural do-
main.
It is impossible to summarize Laclau & Mouffe in a few paragraphs. But
I hope that the above may constitute the foundation to better understand the
changes in discourse on Ayatollah Khomeini, as we have seen that Laclaui
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& Mouffe focus on sites of conﬂict and the struggle that is involved in the
construction of identity.
Case study: Khomeini
In section 2 we concluded that the representation of Ayatollah Khome-
ini on Dutch TV news (that was based on international/Western news feeds)
changed from positive in the early days of the Revolution (1978 and early
1979) to negative in subsequent years (from the end of 1979 onwards). How
could this change occur?To begin with, in the line of Laclau & Mouffe we
can argue that at times of great change meaning structures become visible;
these are moments of dislocation. The condition is that meanings are contin-
gent: there is no ultimate ﬁxation of meanings as they only exist because of
relationships with other meanings. And if those other meanings change, the
relations change and thus the original meaning. To understand the change in
representation of Ayatollah Khomeini we can analyse the changed meanings
to which he is related.
Initially, Khomeini is related to balanced and soft speaking, an intellec-
tual approach, relative accessibility and ﬁrmness. All these aspects are taken
together and give him meaning; it is a ’chain of equivalence’ that can be
represented as ‘A=B=C’. This is coupled with an antagonistic relationship
(‘A=B=C 6= D’). As antagonism the Shah (’D’) stands for e.g. autocracy, ma-
terial exuberance, modernization and violent oppression. Modernization as a
concept largely holds a positive connotation, while autocracy, material exu-
berance (in the form of waste) and violence all hold negative meanings.Thus
the Shah does not embody a singular meaning: in Western media he is rep-
resented as partly good and partly bad. He is not a ‘radical otherness’ but
an ’outside’ to which the representation of the (in Western eyes) newcomer
Khomeini can be related. When in 1978 he appears on Dutch television for
the ﬁrst time, the relationships, including antagonistic ones, have to be formed
in order to ‘construct’ the representation of Khomeini.
Characteristically meanings change as soon as a related meaning changes.
Shortly after the appearance of Ayatollah Khomeini in Western media the
Shah looses political power: early in 1979 he is expelled from Iran and is
then too sick to be able to undertake anything political (he dies of cancer ini
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1980). When amongst others the Shah is lost as an antagonism Khomeini has
to be related to someone/something else to still carry meaning. Were the Shah
would have remained in power then Khomeini could have been related to him
longer. He now disappears from the stage and new meanings must be found to
bring Khomeini in an oppositional relationship. The gap that the Shah leaves
is rapidly ﬁlled. There is a new symbol, not in the form of one person but as
a crowd of people. The existing representations of Iranian crowds is that of
seemingly unorganized groups of people that shout slogans and waive their
ﬁsts. This representation of ‘Islamic crowds’ in news broadcasts seems a pre-
ﬁguration of later Hollywood ﬁlms. According to Campbell (1997) the movie
‘Not without my daughter’ (1991) contains this representation:
‘Always congregated in large groups in the ﬁlm, Iranians communicatie
by simultaneously speaking, often accompanying their speech with use of
hands. Rather than positioning this expressive communication style as a
cultural difference, director Gilbert tries to manipulate the Western viewer
into feeling overwhelmed by loud, illogical people with no conversational
rules.’ (Campbell, 1997: 180)
The crowds of people form a structure consisting of relationships with
e.g. chaos, violence, theimpersonal(almostamorphous)anddivides(between
supporters of various sub-ideologies). According to Fuller such a representa-
tion is exemplary for the most coercive step in the process of stereotyping:
in the so-called ’conscious social commentary’ phase there is an intertwin-
ing of the narrative line and social developments (Fuller, 1997: 188). That
this is also present in non-ﬁction, which is the case with the representation of
Khomeini, is something I will discuss below, but not before I get back to the
toolbox idea of combining Laclau & Mouffe’s work with other theories. In
section 4 I argued that there are conditions for the use of other theories with
their views that are non-essentialist and analyse the entire cultural world in
terms of discourses. Therefore I will now have to make explicit what rela-
tionship I think there is between Laclau & Mouffe and the recently mentioned
Campbell and Fuller.
Campbell and Fuller base their analysis primarily on Said’s Orientalism
(1978). The question is then which position Said takes concerning (non-
)essentialism and discourses. Authors like Mellor (2004) are not the ﬁrst that
in retrospect state that the concept of orientalism is not an entirely coherent
combination of ‘Foucauldian social constructivism’ and ’trans-cultural humani
i
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realities’. I think that, before all, orientalism must be read as a polemical work
of which both an essentialist and a non-essentialist reading is possible. Where
he discusses Western representations of Muslim cultures a non-essentialist
reading is appropriate, while Said lapses into essentialism when proposing
moreadequaterepresentations. AndasCampbellandFullerdeconstructWest-
ern representations their text may be read non-essentialistically. That they are
implicitly based on Said’s use of Foucault makes the above-mentioned ideas
of Campbell and Fuller compatible with Laclau & Mouffe, provided that the
difference between what can be seen as a discourse between on the one hand
Foucault and Said and on the other Laclau and Mouffe is observed. This is
perhaps a very explicit discussion of the ‘toolbox relationship’ between La-
clau & Mouffe and other theories (in other studies this may be mentioned in
a note), but I think that this is necessary, since one purpose of this article is
to illustrate how the in itself already interdisciplinary cultural studies can be
combined with the work of Laclau & Mouffe.
Back now to Fuller: building on what Fuller calls a ’conscious social
commentary (an integration of narrative line and social developments), we
can conclude that this also applies to non-ﬁction. It is notable that Ayatollah
Khomeini is not represented as equal to the crowds, but that he is constructed
as different from them; he is able to both calm and excite crowds. Thus we
see him addressing a crowd of grievers after 72 political and spiritual leaders
havedied, includingKhomeini’soldcomradeAyatollahBehesti. 14 Thecrowd
chants slogans and seems to exist in itself. A small truck covered with facial
images drives through the crowd. Many portraits, including that of Khomeini,
are held up in the air. In the subsequent segment we see and hear Khomeini:
he speaks to men who cry, hold their heads and utter inaudible sentences; with
his speech Khomeini guides their mourning process. After some time the men
appear to be comforted by his words. The opposite also happens: Khomeini
not calming people but arousing them. In his condemnation of the laying of
mines in the Red Sea, we see him addressing a large group of men. 15 He is
holding up his right arm. By the time he is ﬁnished speaking and gets out
of his chair we hear the men shouting slogans energetically. Khomeini, the
embodiment of control, plays the people. Yet it is not the crowd that he holds
14. HET JOURNAAL 30 June 1981.
15. HET JOURNAAL 10 August 1984.i
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an antagonistic relationship to. He does so with what the crowds represent;
the excited groups carry the meaning of ‘emotional’ or ‘irrational’. And that
is with what Khomeini enters an antagonistic relationship into; as very con-
trolled ’master’ of irrational forces, Khomeini is the opposite of irrationality
(‘A6=B’).
This representation in the West of Khomeini as ‘master’ of emotional
crowds is dominant from the end of 1979 onwards. Several times, a contrast
between him and others becomes visible. Regularly we see him in his Mosque
addressing people: these people are always shown as masses (instead of in-
dividuals) with a lot of emotions, whilst Khomeini represents calmness. 16A
striking example is the blessing of members of the Air Force. 17 These sol-
diers do not conform to the Western image of soldiers: instead of dealing with
instructions in a disciplined manner, they are excited. They shout slogans and
wave their ﬁsts. In sharp contrast to this Khomeini, sitting on a raised ﬂoor,
remains stoical: he says nothing and gazes straight ahead. He then raises his
right hand; the shouting of the military men becomes more controlled as they
now together with clergy men shout ‘in a single voice’ – only Khomeini is
silent. This is also the dominant representation during the condemnation of
Salman Rushdie. 18 Khomeini is again seated on the raised ﬂoor from where
he preaches. He blesses war veterans, allows a clergy man to repeat his call to
kill Rushdie, and ﬁnally raises his right hand again. The role of the crowd is
limited to shouting slogans and displaying combativeness.
Where in Western media such support is associated with irrationality,
Khomeini stands for control. That makes him a powerful, even threatening,
person in Western eyes: because of his self-control he seems to have control
over irrationality. And irrationality is something that is regarded as highly
threathening in Western culture (Neiman, 2004).
Khomeini has, according to a western perspective, control over threaten-
ing irrationality, and that makes him even more frightening: he is represented
as an antagonist of large dimensions as he is able to both unleash and control
irrationality. In the representation of Ayatollah Khomeini, the West is thus
confronted with its own long and deep struggle with irrationality.
16. E.g. HET JOURNAAL 29 July 1987 and 26 July 1988.
17. HET JOURNAAL 9 February 1989.
18. HET JOURNAAL 21 February 1989.i
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As Laclau & Mouffe focus on the relationships between meanings, the
analysis of Ayatollah Khomeini can be extended by turning to other mean-
ings. He is not only associated with the Shah and irrationality, but also with,
for example, Saddam Hussein who was in the early 1980’s still respectable in
Western eyes. The Iran-Iraq war, which lasted from 1980 to 1988, caused an
antagonistic relationship between Khomeini and Saddam.Also, the represen-
tation of Khomeini can be analyzed by laying bare discourses about the USA:
the USA granted political and other support to the Shah and opposed Khome-
ini. I can not help feeling that the valuation of Khomeini by leftist Western
intellectuals (who, as mentioned, saw him as just, non-materialistic, etc.) may
have been fed by an anti-Americanism which was then in vogue. These and
other meanings to which Ayatollah Khomeini can be related make interest-
ing future research material. 19 For now it sufﬁces to note that the change of
discourse on Ayatollah Khomeini in the West can be understood by looking
at (a) meanings with which he is associated (both in the form of a ’chain of
equivalence’ and as ‘antagonism’) and (b) the explanatory power of Laclau &
Mouffe regarding the (changes in the) constructions of meanings.
Relevance of Laclau & Mouffe for cultural studies
When media, conﬂicts and identity (politics) are the subject of research,
cultural studies can very well beneﬁt from the work of Laclau & Mouffe: both
are ‘politicised’ approaches, according to Bowman (2007). Where cultural
studies is concerned with politicising daily practices post-Marxist discourse
theory (as that of Laclau & Mouffe) is interested in political strategies. 20 The
adoption of Laclau & Mouffe’s work by cultural studies is therefore appropri-
ate and productive.
Besides the political aspect cultural studies and Laclau & Mouffe have
more in common that makes integration worth pursuiting. Both see research
into ‘meanings’ as central to understanding (and changing) societies. Laclau
& Mouffe have stated this repeatedly (e.g. 1985, 1990a, 1990b), while, for
19. The selected case material does not allow me to discuss this further; to analyse, for
example, relationships between Ayatollah Khomeini and Saddam Hussein or the United States
more keywords than the one mentioned in note 4 are required.
20. See amongst others the section ‘The discourse of post-Marxism’ in chapter one of Bow-
man (2007: 10-24).i
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instance, cultural studies theorist Gray states that “Culture is understood as
being actively produced through complex processes. It is broadly the produc-
tion of meaning or ‘signifying practice’ that happens at every level of the so-
cial and at every moment within cultural processes” (Gray, 2003: 12). 21 The
social struggle between dominant and subaltern groups is seen as a conﬂict of
meanings: “A set of social relations obviously requires meanings and frame-
works which underpin them and hold them in place” (Hall in Fiske, 1987:
52). The conﬂict of meanings is therefore a conﬂict over whose interests are
(most) served by society at large. According to Corner (1991) this idea limits
the central questions in cultural studies to: what meaning is being construed,
why is it this particular meaning and how does this particular meaning relate
to power, knowledge, identity, etc? 22
The ‘meaning struggles’ being researched and conceptualised in cultural
studies, that build upon the work of Gramsci, is often considered to be a class-
struggle: “The concept of hegemony is used by Gramsci to refer to a condition
in progress, in which a dominant class (in alliance with other classes or class
fractions) does not merely rule a society but leads it through the exercise of
‘moral and intellectual leadership’” (Storey, 2001: 103. Emphasis in origi-
nal). The importance of Gramsci’s hegemony to cultural studies is twofold.
It makes it possible (and necessary) to view popular culture (as a pillar of ev-
eryday life) as an arena, as a struggle about social power. Also, Gramsci has
ensured that the concept of popular culture was revised: it is the combination
of ideas on culture industry (culture as a ’structure’) and ideas about culture
as "bottom-up” effect (culture as ’agency’). This combination enables culture
to be seen as an ’equilibrium’ of opposing forces: top-down and bottom-up
(Storey, 1999: 149). Storey (2001) therefore speaks of ‘neo-Gramscian cul-
tural studies’ as Gramsci’s focus on class is supplemented with an interest in
concepts like gender, race, ethnicity, religion etc.
In this essay I hope to have demonstrated that the work of Laclau &
Mouffe enables us to use a coherent, single theory (possibly supplemented
with other theories as discussed in section 4) in the diverse neo-Gramscian
21. For the two conditions to obtain meaning making successfully, see Hermes (1995: 7).
For problematic meaning making and the corresponding temporal structure, see Leurs (2009).
22. Though Corner does not distance himself from the primacy of meaning making, he
merelymakesitproblematical. Thisprimacycausesthewholebodyofculturalstudiesresearch
to consist of research into ‘negotiated reading’ (Gray, 1999: 27)i
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cultural studies research into social struggle, whereby it, in contrast with Fou-
cault, conceives the whole cultural ﬁeld as being of a discursive nature (as
Derrida (1978: 280) states: “everything becomes discourse”). This is not a
denial of the existence of material objects, but the assumption that:
“[t]he fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has
nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with that
realism / idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an
event that certainly exists in the sense that it occurs here and now, indepen-
dently of my will. But whether their speciﬁcity as objects is constructed
in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, de-
pends upon the structuring of a discursive ﬁeld. What is denied is not that
such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion
that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive con-
ditions of emergence.” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 108)
The result of integrating Laclau & Mouffe’s discourse theory in cultural
studies is that research into social struggle can be radicalized: if all aspects of
social struggle are of a discursive nature (in contrast with e.g. Foucault) the
ﬁeld of ‘meaning relations’ can be extended, contributing to new answers to
the three questions formulated by Corner.
This will, however, not be possible without keeping an eye on the dif-
ferences between cultural studies and Laclau & Mouffe. 23 Most importantly,
where their discourse theory is completely non-essentialist some cultural stud-
ies research is of a neo-marxist nature, putting social class central to societal
structures. This is not to say that neo-marxism can be reduced to an essen-
tialisation of social class, but that the concept of social class is still prominent
in some cultural studies. Laclau & Mouffe demonstrate that one can research
themes that are historically associated with neo-marxism, for instance the de-
construction of naturalisations, the suggestion of alternative meanings and so-
cial conﬂict, on entirely (and thereby non-essentialist) discourse analytical
grounds. This post-marxist approach might prove to be inspiring as well as
productive for cultural studies.
23. For a survey of general critique on Laclau & Mouffe (as well as counter arguments), see:
Carpentier & Spinoy (2008: 13-16) and Jørgensen & Phillips (2002: 179-185).i
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